underwatered dracaena Shop 'Dracaena Lemon Surprise Plant' Care & Growing Guide
SKU: 18091848855
underwatered dracaena

underwatered dracaena Shop 'Dracaena Lemon Surprise Plant' Care & Growing Guide

$18.63 $20.70
Save 10%
No.2 Bestseller on virtipatel.com >

Shipping Estimate
USA
  • USA
  • CAN

Ships within 48 hours · Estimated delivery Jul 9 - Jul 14

Promo Codes Available:

For Your Every Summer RSVP, with Code: SUMMER15

Description

underwatered dracaena Shop 'Dracaena Lemon Surprise Plant' Care & Growing GuideThe Dracaena Lemon Surprise is a striking and low maintenance houseplant admired for its lively, lime green foliage and easy adaptability. This variety is especially popular because of its twisting, variegated leaves that feature lime green, dark green, and creamy white streaks. Its tolerance to low light, infrequent watering, and typical household conditions makes it a go to option for offices, apartments, and homes where fuss free greenery is

The Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ is a striking and low-maintenance houseplant admired for its lively, lime-green foliage and easy adaptability. This variety is especially popular because of its twisting, variegated leaves that feature lime green, dark green, and creamy white streaks. Its tolerance to low light, infrequent watering, and typical household conditions makes it a go-to option for offices, apartments, and homes where fuss-free greenery is appreciated. 

Native to Tropical Africa, the Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ features long, lance-shaped leaves that grow tight, whorled rosettes atop upright stems.

The foliage is its main attraction, with bright, glossy textures and elegantly twisted shapes that give the plant a sculptural appearance.

When mature, it can grow up to 3 feet tall indoors, with a spread of 2 feet, making it a compact choice for tabletops, shelves, or floor containers.

The lemon surprise plant may occasionally bloom in spring and summer under ideal conditions, with small, fragrant white flowers.

However, the blooms are not showy and are typically overshadowed by the plant’s stunning foliage, which remains the primary ornamental value.

What sets ‘Lemon Surprise’ apart from other Dracaena cultivars is the spontaneous variegation and twisted leaf formation, which gives the plant a wild, energetic look.

Unlike many other variegated varieties, the coloration remains relatively stable across different light levels, making it a versatile design plant for both bright and dim rooms. It is also known for being one of the most resilient Dracaenas, forgiving of neglect and adaptable to different environments.

When and How to Water Your Lemon Surprise Plant 

Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ is a drought-tolerant plant that requires moderate watering and prefers its soil to dry out slightly between waterings. As a drought-tolerant species, overwatering is a more serious risk than underwatering. The lemon surprise plant prefers watering once every 10–14 days in spring and summer months, and once every 3–4 weeks during fall and winter.  

From March to August, during the growing season, water the plant thoroughly every 10 to 14 days, allowing the top 2 inches of soil to dry out completely before the next watering. This active growth period requires a more consistent moisture level, but still far less than tropical plants. Use room-temperature, filtered water if possible, and always empty drainage trays to avoid soggy roots. 

From September to February, in the dormant season, reduce watering to every 3 to 4 weeks, giving just enough moisture to prevent shriveling. At this time, the plant's metabolic rate slows, and too much water can lead to root rot. Always check the soil dryness before watering during this period. 

Light Requirements – Where to Place Your Dracaena Lemon Surprise  

When grown indoors, the Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ thrives in bright, indirect light for 6 to 8 hours per day but can tolerate lower light conditions, making it ideal for offices and indoor corners.

Place it near a north- or east-facing window, or a few feet away from a south-facing one with filtered light. Too little light may result in leggy growth and faded variegation. 

When grown outdoors, this plant does best in dappled sunlight or light shade for about 4 to 6 hours per day, and should be protected from harsh afternoon sun.

In shaded patios or under trees, it can grow well as a container plant during warmer months.

Never expose it to direct sunlight for prolonged periods, especially in hot climates, as it may cause scorched leaves. 

If moving between indoor and outdoor environments, gradually acclimate the plant to new light levels to prevent shock or sunburn. Abrupt changes in lighting conditions can lead to yellowing leaves or slowed growth. 

Optimal Soil & Fertilizer Needs 

The Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ grows best in loose, well-draining potting soil with a slightly acidic to neutral pH, and should be fertilized once a year in spring. Planting them in ordinary soil will result in compacted roots, stunted growth, and most likely root rot. Instead, make or buy a well-draining potting mix, or ideally use our specialized potting mix, opens in a new tabGo to soil cactus mix blend 1 gal 4 qt cacti succulent dirt compost growing media that contains 5 natural substrates and mycorrhizae to promote the development of a strong root system that helps your lemon surprise plant  

Fertilize your plant once a year in spring with a balanced, water-soluble houseplant fertilizer diluted to half strength. Over-fertilizing can lead to salt buildup and leaf tip burn, so less is more with Dracaenas. Always water before and after applying fertilizer to prevent root damage. 

Avoid fertilizing in the dormant period (fall and winter), as the plant's nutrient needs drop significantly, and added fertilizer may stress the roots. You can resume feeding in early spring when new growth appears. 

Hardiness Zones & More 

In the United States, the Lemon surprise is mostly an indoor plant, but if you live in southern Florida or Hawaii, then you can cultivate it outdoors in USDA zones 10-11.

Place it in a shaded or semi-shaded area with filtered light. It is not frost-hardy and must be brought indoors if temperatures fall below 50°F. 

If grown outdoors seasonally, it should be transitioned back indoors in early fall before night temperatures dip, ideally in a spot with similar light and humidity levels to avoid stress. 

How to Best Grow a Lemon Surprise Houseplant Indoors 

When grown indoors, Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ prefers temperatures between 65°F and 80°F, with average household humidity and indirect light. It adapts well to indoor environments and will tolerate typical indoor fluctuations as long as it’s kept away from cold drafts or heating vents. A humidity level of around 40–50% is ideal. 

Wildlife – Lemon Surprise Plant Attracts the Following Friendly Pollinators 

Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ is primarily a foliage plant and does not attract pollinators in a meaningful way, as it rarely flowers indoors. While outdoor specimens may produce small, fragrant flowers, they are not a major attractant for pollinators like bees or butterflies. 

According to the ASPCA, Dracaena species are mildly toxic to dogs and cats if ingested in large amounts, causing symptoms such as vomiting, drooling, and lack of coordination. Bird owners should also exercise caution, as no Dracaena species are considered bird-safe. However, it is safe to handle and touch, making it a popular choice for indoor decoration in homes with pets as long as precautions are taken to prevent ingestion. 

How to Propagate Your Dracaena Lemon Surprise Plant 

The Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ is best propagated through stem cuttings, which can root easily in water or soil with the right technique. To propagate, select a healthy stem with at least 3–5 inches of length and several healthy leaves. Cut just below a node using sterilized scissors or pruning shears. If rooting in water, place the cutting in a glass with only the bottom inch submerged and change the water every few days.

Once roots reach 1–2 inches in length, transplant into well-draining soil. If rooting in soil directly, use a rooting hormone and keep the medium slightly moist in bright, indirect light. Rooting usually takes 4–6 weeks, and new shoots may emerge within two months. 

Key Takeaways

  1. This plant's striking foliage with lime-green, cream, and dark green variegation adds a lively, tropical appearance to indoor spaces.
  2. The compact, upright growth habit makes it ideal for use as a tabletop plant, office décor, or narrow corners, growing up to 2-3 feet tall indoors.
  3. Extremely drought-tolerant and low maintenance, requiring only occasional watering and thriving even with neglect, ideal for busy or beginner plant owners.
  4. The lemon surprise plant acts as a natural air purifier, helping to remove indoor toxins such as formaldehyde and benzene while improving air quality.
  5. The lemon surprise plant thrives in bright, indirect light but can also tolerate low light levels, making it one of the most adaptable and forgiving indoor plants available.

The Bottom Line 

Overall, the Dracaena ‘Lemon Surprise’ is a vibrant, low-care houseplant ideal for beginners and collectors alike. With its striking variegated foliage in lime and dark green tones, it brings visual interest to any room. Its drought-tolerant nature, flexibility with indoor lighting, and ease of propagation make it a perfect addition to modern living spaces. Whether placed in a bright corner or grown on a shaded patio in warm climates, this plant offers reliable beauty with minimal effort. 

Shipping Notes
  • Free Standard Shipping on $100+ Orders to the USA.
  • Except Preorder products are shipped in 48 hours.
  • Delivery to the USA:
  1. Standard Shipping : 3-10 business days
  • If time is of the essence, please consider selecting expedited delivery for faster service.
Exchange/Return Notes
  • We offer a 30-day return/exchange service after receiving.
  • Final sale items are not eligible for returns or exchanges.
  • To process your return/exchange, please contact us at [email protected]
  • Please click here for more details>>> Return & Exchange Policy
SKU: 18091848855

Discover Niche Categories That Outsell underwatered dracaena

Top-Converting Item to Boost Your Average Order

4.1 ★★★★★
Based on 675 reviews
Sort
Highest Rating
Newest First
Oldest First
Product Reviews
P
Verified Purchase
Paul
Chelsea, US
★★★★★ 5
American Bullies at Bretton Woods
Format: Hardcover
There, I said it, and I am an American. I had heard of the conference but never read about it, and certainly had never heard of Harry Dexter White, but this book goes to great length to explain what happened in this important meeting as World War II was drawing to a close and a plan needed to be developed for a new world order regarding the flows of money to facilitate trade and avoid economic disruptions that the world had seen far too much of. Steil presents more information on John Maynard Keynes than his American antithesis, Harry Dexter White, and for good reason. Keynes was simply one of the most, if not the most, brilliant intellectuals of the 20th century. His theories of economics were evolving through his life, but he is most remembered for his idea that government stimulus could help alleviate a faltering economy when the private sector failed to do the job, and he was opposed as he said to the "gold cage" that for years had been the standard of international finance. He had a biting wit, coupled with a superior intelligence that far outshone his meager appearance (he was ugly, and knew it) but he was cast in the role of a diplomat to present the case for England as the world entered the post war period. The problem was that England was broke. She had endured two world wars in the space of 30 years and the empire was begging for funds from Washington, and most of her debt to the US from the Great War was still unpaid. She also had an enemy in FDR, who was determined that the imperial preference of England after the war was to be no more. Her crown jewel, India, was pressing for independence and the empire was in the process of unwinding, as was the strength of the British sterling. Keynes pressed to have the new institutions of the World Bank and the IMF located in London, and the Americans under the leadership of White simply said "hell no." Enter Harry Dexter White. The name is as deceptive as the individual. He was a son of Jewish immigrants, graduating from Harvard late in life, but brilliant in his intellect and determined that America would rule by the strenght of the dollar and Britain was to be no more as a world power. It was interesting to me to see the Treasury Department so powerful over this whole thing. You may think that the Department of State would have more of an influence because these were important global decisions, but their input was minimal. Regardless, White was a Soviet sympathizer and was just in the process of getting raked over the coals when he died early after the war from a heart attack. Keynes also died at the age of 62, not long after the war. The world remember Keynes and White is more of a footnote. I personally did not like White. He reminded me of a Himmler with his rim glasses and nasty litte mustache. As for his boss, Henry Morganthau, Secretary of Treasury, he was little better. His idiotic plan to strip Germany of all industrial capability after the war and turn it into a nation of small farms was leaked to the press and Goebbels made hay of it, likely resulting in many more American casualities toward the end of the war. Just goes to show that FDR used some strange people in his administration. Thank God his selection of generals was far better. America was brutal toward the British at Bretton Woods. We often think of the English speaking peoples uniting and working together in true harmony to defeat the fascist nations. That is a myth and this book helps bust it. It shows to me how inhuman America was to our British allies, who bore much of the battle of this war alone, with little hope of survival. It is said that when Winston Churchill learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor, he knew that England would win the war and when he retired, he slept like a baby. Little did he know that the selfishness of the U.S. government would put a boot on the neck of England after the war. Churchill once said that the Germans were either at your throat or under your foot. The later part of that pertains to the American response to England toward the end of the war and after. A good book. Great information, and highly recommended.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on March 9, 2013
A
Verified Purchase
Andrew A.
New York, US
★★★★★ 4
Easy read on Difficult subject
Format: Kindle
This well-documented book explodes the myth of Bretton Woods. The battle between Harry White and John Maynard Keynes turns out to have been contrived.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on May 30, 2026
E
Verified Purchase
Eric G
Pawtucket, US
★★★★★ 5
A great book for anyone interested in US foreign policy, history, or economics
Format: Hardcover
In July of 1944 representatives from forty-four nations gathered at the Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, NH to establish the rules for the post World War II international monetary system. Although nations from around the globe were at the table, the primary debate was between the United States and Great Britain. The U.S. was determined to advance a policy ensuring the dollar reigned supreme in world trade, thus guaranteeing American dominance. The British were holding out for a monetary system that would not relegate them to a secondary status after the war. Representing the two great nations were two men. For the U.S. it was a little-known economist working as an assistant to the Secretary of Treasury, Harry Dexter White, and representing the British was world-known economist John Maynard Keynes. Benn Steil examines the Bretton Woods conference, and the inter-war years leading up to it, using these two men as a backdrop. Not only is the work well researched, but as a senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, Steil is eminently qualified to make economic judgements. Steil’s thoroughness and expertise combine to make an enjoyable read of what could otherwise be an exceptionally dry topic. The main argument Steil makes is that the dominance of dollar in the post WWII economy was a fait accompli at Bretton Woods. Mr. Steil introduces the reader to the relatively unknown Harry Dexter White, a minor player at the U.S. Treasury commanding great influence. Steil shows the reader that going into Bretton Woods, White and his boss, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, were committed to bringing President Roosevelt’s New Deal to the rest of the world. Part of this plan was to shift power not only from London, but from Wall Street as well, to the U.S. Treasury. White was convinced international banking had played a key role in creating the instability responsible for WWII. A new gold standard tied to the U.S. dollar would ensure stability in White’s view. Ultimately White’s ideas led to the creation of “the three so-called Bretton Woods institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank” (Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods, 127). Adding intrigue to economics Steil also shows through declassified F.B.I. documents and recently discovered writings by White, that White was an agent of the Soviet Union. Keynes is often regarded as “the first-ever international celebrity economist” (Steil, The Battle of Bretton Woods, 3). While this may be true, he was no match for the little-known White. White (and Morgenthau) considered the British a threat on the economic stage and made sure their Lend-Lease terms would bankrupt the U.K. by the end of the war and bring them to the bargaining table. As well as being an interesting historical read, and a useful primer on international monetary policy, Steil captures the importance of economic policy in relation to foreign policy. Morgenthau and White realized the power of the U.S. to inflict its will upon other nations was rooted in the power of the dollar. Today as then, U.S. power flows from the economy. Students of modern U.S. foreign policy would be wise to have a basic understanding of U.S. economic policy and how the U.S. economy interacts in the global system.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on March 2, 2020
E
Verified Purchase
Etienne RP
Houston, US
★★★★★ 5
Hosting Diplomatic Conferences 101: The Case of Bretton Woods
Format: Paperback
Bretton Woods was the most important international gathering since the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. I read this book looking for clues on how to host international conferences: how to accommodate delegates, maintain protocol, overcome obstacles, build consensus, and reach a satisfying outcome. I was disappointed on that count. The Battle of Bretton Woods doesn’t focus on the Bretton Woods conference per se. It is a work of intellectual history built around the two characters of John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White. It describes the way these two Treasury officials negotiated the main financial issues facing the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II and immediately after: the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 granting the British access to war finance and equipment; the blueprints for a postwar monetary order that began circulating in 1942 and ultimately culminated in the adoption of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at Bretton Woods; the signing of the $4.4 billion Anglo-American Financial Agreement in December 1945; and the inaugural meeting of the IMF board of governors in Savannah, Georgia, on March 8, 1946. It mixes these elements of diplomatic history with personal aspects of the lives of the two main characters: Keynes’s inflated ego and lack of diplomatic acumen that resulted in missed opportunities for Great Britain; and White’s dual personality as the braintrust of the US Treasury and as a mole operating clandestinely for the Soviets. To be sure, there are some useful indications on the Bretton Woods conference itself. It took place in the Mount Washington Hotel in New Hampshire, a luxury resort with striking views of the White Mountains. The organization itself was a mess: “everything is in a state of glorious confusion,” commented British economist Lionel Robbins, who added: “with all their virtues as technicians—and these are very great—the Americans are not good organizers of international conferences.” The conference took place in war time, and army bus and personnel brought the delegates in and out. Delegates were thrown out of the hotel on July 23 for fear they would reopen the discussion and have a closer look at the hastily agreed texts. The location itself owed a lot to domestic politics. US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau wanted to court a local politician for future support of the agreement in the Senate, remembering the disastrous defeat of Wilson’s League of Nations in Congress after World War I. The press was also in attendance, and Bretton Woods became one of the first international conferences to be covered live by the media. Most of the delegates came from Ministries of Finance or central banks, and true diplomats—the ones hailing from Ministries of Foreign Affairs—were a rare occurrence. The US Treasury Department had willingly kept the State Department out of the loop, and considered the only senior diplomat present, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, as “one of them”. The conference was only the tip of the iceberg: everything was set in advance, during the two years when plans were circulated and drafts were discussed. The invitations were sent to forty-four nations, but the United States ran the show from start to finish, and even British delegates were relegated to a secondary role. Keynes, who had termed the Reconstruction Bank scheme imagined by White “the work of a lunatic,…some sort of bad joke,” was named chairman of the commission that drafted the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, while White himself dealt with the much more significant IMF. As for other nations, their input was limited to discussing the national quotas that would measure their relative power and influence at the boards of the two institutions or, in the case of the Cubans, to “providing the cigars”. White’s goal was to “channel the energy, aims, ambitions, and vanities of the mass of delegates into meaningless debate.” As an American organizer wily remarked, “there should be just one general rule: that anybody can talk as long as he pleases, provided he doesn’t say anything.” To make things even safer, the session secretaries were all Americans, appointed by White, and it was they who wrote the official minutes of the committees. Some important remarks made during sessions disappeared from the draft minutes, while crucial provisions were introduced surreptitiously in the final text versions. As an example, White’s technicians strategically replaced “gold” with “gold and dollars” in the paper describing the foundations of the postwar monetary order, a crucial modification that Keynes discovered only after his departure from Bretton Woods. The result was, in Keynes’s words, “the most monstrous monkey-house assembled for years.” The distinguished Cambridge don liked that expression, and indeed often referred to non-Anglo-saxons as monkeys, with a special mention to the French which he utterly despised. But the monkey-king in this diplomatic jungle was certainly Keynes himself. Long before Paul Krugman and Thomas Piketty, Keynes was the first-ever international celebrity economist. He was surrounded by an aura of awe and admiration, and the printed media craved for his every declarations. In Benn Steil’s rendering, he had “an effortless facility with words that might have made him a master diplomat, had he actually been more concerned with convincing opponents than with cornering them logically and humiliating them.” “The man is a menace for international relations,” remarked fellow British economist James Meade, who nonetheless revered him. He would make aggressive jokes on lawyers in front of American lawyers, show his contempt for other delegates by displaying his immense intellectual superiority, and try to steal the show by pretending the outcomes of negotiations were all due to his influence while in fact they ran counter to his prescriptions. His last speech in Savannah, where he metaphorically summoned spirits and fairies to bestow the newborn institutions with their gifts, was taken as a personal attack by the American delegate: “I do mind being called a fairy,” he muttered to his aide. If a statesman is to be judged by his capacity to serve the national interest, Keynes failed miserably in his attempt at statesmanship. This is not to say that he didn’t have Britain’s interest in mind. His visionary monetary schemes notwithstanding, he had ultimately come to the United States with the mission of conserving what he could of bankrupt Britain’s historic imperial prerogatives. As Schumpeter wrote, “Keynes’s advice was in the first instance always English advice, born of English problems.” Keynes was thoroughly British, and it was the British problems of his day that drove his theorizing: problems of deflation and depression, paying for war and surviving the perilous transition to peace. He had spent his career thinking about monetary issues as a way to preserve his country’s clout in the world. In particular, the shift of financial power from London to New York was a matter of constant concern for him. But he lacked the basic insight that the Americans did not share British national interests, and that they could even be rival powers on the international scene. Throughout the war, Keynes continuously overestimated American sympathies with Britain and underestimated the importance of public and congressional resistance to US aid or involvement. He thought of Bretton Woods as a battle of ideas, counting on his immense intellectual superiority to carry the day, whereas it was first and foremost a battle of power and influence, with the United States as the clear winner. Indeed, British and American interests were not identical, however much both peoples were dedicated to destroying Nazism. Henry White had a clear goal in Bretton Woods: to entrench the dollar as the world’s currency, and to make it “as good as gold”. He used the leverage provided by the Lend-Lease agreement and Britain’s quasi-bankrupt situation in order to put a permanent end to the pound sterling’s international role. This required dismantling the structural supports of the British empire. In particular, Americans sought to put an end to “imperial preference”, by which Britain secured privileged trade access to the markets of its colonies and dominions. There was no room in the new order for the remnants of British imperial glory: the postwar world needed to be grounded in nondiscriminatory multilateral trade and full monetary convertibility. The Americans never deviated from their hard-line geopolitical terms. Many held no particular sympathy for the British, who had “shamefully walked away from their Great War debt obligations,” and who were trying to extend their Empire’s lease of life by credit. At Bretton Woods, we see American power in full swing, and in particular the role of the US Treasury as the economic arm of American foreign policy. Contrary to the myth, Bretton Woods did not provide the economic foundation for postwar prosperity and monetary stability. And it was not the cooperative, disinterested, forward-looking endeavor that people often have in mind when they stress the need for a new Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods system didn’t work the way it was supposed to. It was effective for only a brief period, and then not for the reason its authors had envisaged. It was not until 1961, fifteen years after the IMF was inaugurated, that the first nine European countries formally adopted the required provisions that their currencies be convertible into dollars. Even then, Bretton Woods was an ineffective and crisis-prone monetary system. It began experiencing potentially fatal difficulties as early as the late 1950s, and was only kept alive by a series of political fixes that made little long-term, macroeconomic sense. It could never have survived the globalization of finance and the removal of capital controls that began to take place in the 1970s. Indeed, it can be argued that the system was doomed the moment that it came into existence, and that the Bretton Woods agreements contained fatal flaws that could only lead to the abandon of gold convertibility. Not only was Bretton Woods a crisis-prone, unstable system: it was also a bad deal for Great Britain and, one could argue, for the United States and for the world as well. What Britain actually needed in 1944-45 was short-term financing at reasonable cost with few geopolitical strings attached, and possibly a lower exchange rate. There was evident hubris in the attempt to design a global monetary system, to be managed by an international body, at a time when the outcome of the war was not yet clear. Keynes and White’s ambition was to create “a New Deal for a new world,” but they lacked the political legitimacy and also the effective means to achieve such a grand plan. Another course of action was possible for the United Kingdom, one suggested by a British Treasury official after the facts: postpone the “Grand Design” negotiations, avoid irreversible decisions, try to buy time until you see how the new postwar world develops, and borrow your way out of the crisis by getting a commercial loan from Wall Street. Who at Bretton Woods would have thought that the British empire would unravel, the United States and the Soviet Union turn into arch-enemies, and the world divide into hostile camps just two years after the conference? There was no necessity to conclude Bretton Woods in a haste. Waiting for the San Francisco conference to address the issue of money and finance jointly with the creation of the United Nations would have made the postwar institutional framework more coherent. The world would have avoided the dichotomy between the Bretton Woods institutions in Washington and the United Nations in New York, in which both seem to live on completely different planes. So are there practical lessons from Bretton Woods for statesmen and diplomats hosting international meetings, such as the Paris Conference on Climate Change that will take place in end-November and December 2015? First, as the previous attempt to tackle climate change at Copenhagen taught us, the summit itself is not the place where comprehensive negotiations should take place. Most items on the agenda should be solved beforehand, in preparatory meetings among experts or in a pre-summit rehearsal such as the UN General Assembly in New York. Second, organizers should make sure they keep a bone for the leaders and national delegates to chew, one that is easy enough to grasp and with a clear payoff in terms of national interest, such as the quota issue at Bretton Woods. Managing expectations and egos will always be a tricky issue, but one that diplomats are best equipped to handle. How to deal with the media is also a key issue, particularly in our age of instant communication and world broadcasting. Lastly, a modicum of modesty should be in order: the world is not going to be saved by international conferences, however successful they turn out to be. For Britain in 1944 and for the planet as a whole in 2015, buying time is always a sensible option.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on September 10, 2015
A
Verified Purchase
active reader
Dallas, US
★★★★★ 3
History worth reading
Format: Kindle
Presents the history of the Bretton Woods conference, creation of the World Bank and the IMF and global and US politics surrounding the events. Discussion of Harry Dexter White, key US representative at Bretton Woods focuses on claims he was a Soviet spy beginning in the late 1930s and continuing through the conference and into the late 1940s; spends more time than necessary on this even though it is not clear how this affected the outcome of the conference. Most of the discussion of Keynes is on his reputation rather than his economics. Not the definitive history of Bretton Woods.
WAS THIS REVIEW HELPFUL?YesReportShare
Reviewed in the United States on July 10, 2013

recommand products

Maxi-Cosi Gia XP Luxe 3-Wheel Travel System, Midnight Moon
23.06
Deluxe 3 in 1 Baby Stroller & Car Seat – Maternity Miracles
27.57
Baby Trend Lil' Snooze Deluxe II Nursery Center Playard in Twinkle Twinkle Little Moon
21.04
Maxi-Cosi Gia XP Luxe 3-Wheel Travel System, Midnight Moon
26.31
Baby Trend Debut Sport Wheel Lightweight Jogging Stroller Boulder Reclining Seat
29.41